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CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA: AN OVERVIEW
by Walter Bergen
Walter Bergen (Mennonite) is with his wife Janet a co-country representative of the 
Mennonite Central Committee in the former Soviet Union stationed primarily in Moscow 
but with responsibilities for Chechnya. He holds a Master of Christian Studies from 
Regent College in Vancouver, British Columbia in Canada and a Master of Divinity from 
the Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminary in Elkhart, Indiana. He sent this article on 
March 19, 1995. 
INTRODUCTION
On the night of December 31, 1995, Russian Federation forces launched a massive tank 
and infantry assault on the city of Grozny. The attack and subsequent defeat of Federal 
forces by lightly armed Chechen irregulars, propelled a little-known Caucasian people 
and city onto the TV screens and newspaper headlines of the Western world. The purpose 
of this article is to provide readers with the context for the present conflict in Chechnya, 
to describe some early efforts at peace making in the region, and to offer a preliminary 
analysis of the consequences of the conflict. This overview comes from the vantage point 
of field work in the former Soviet Union, with little access to what has been written about 
the Caucasus in the last few years. The overview summarizes conversations and meetings 
in which the author was an active participant. 
GEOGRAPHY
Chechnya-Ingushetia under the Soviet Union was a small Caucasian Autonomous region 
encompassing nearly 20,000 sq. kilometers and approximately 1 1/4 million people. 
When Chechnya declared independence from the Soviet Union in September 1991, 
Ingushetia decided to remain within what became the Russian Federation. The land rises 
in from rolling plains in the north to an east-west cordillera in the south reaching in 
excess of 14,000 ft. Chechnya is bordered on the west by Ingushetia, an ethnic and 
linguistically related Caucasian ethnic group. To the north is the Russian Federation, to 
the east Daghestan, and the south Georgia. Georgia and Russia have traditionally been 
Christian (Orthodox), and the Ingush and Daghestani have traditionally been Muslim. 
Chechens are one ethnic group in the midst of a plethora of ethnic groups populating the 
North Caucusus. Closely related to the Ingush, Chechens share the mountainous regions 
of the North Caucusus with Circassians, Daghestani (they being a conglomeration of 
many minor tribes), and Abkhazians. 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS
When a Mongol army was defeated at Kulikovo field in 1380, it signalled the turning 
point in Mongol fortunes upon Russian soil and the beginning of Russian expansionism. 
This victory with its strong historical links to Russian Orthodoxy in popular Russian 
imagination served to bring together Russian colonial aspirations and the spread of 
Orthodoxy in what was to become Tsarist Russia. 
Fighting a series of wars through the 15th and 16th century Russia defeated and annexed 
by turns Mongol/Muslim khanates on the Volga and in Central Asia. The first to fall was 
Tatarstan in 1552. With the capture of Astrakhan by Ivan the Terrible in 1556, the 
Caucuses became the focus of an international struggle that would pit the Ottoman 
Empire, the Crimean Khanate, Tsarist Russia, the Shaybanis of Turkestan and Iran in a 
250-year-long chess game. The outcome of that struggle would end disastrously for the 
Caucasian inhabitants. "From 1552 until the eve of the Russian Revolution in 1917, 
Tsarist Russia extended its conquest of Muslim lands and incorporated them into the 
Russian empire." 
According to Marie Bennigsen Broxup in her excellent introduction to the history of the 
North Caucasus in The North Caucasus Barrier, the history of Russia's engagement with 
the Caucuses can be separated into five periods. 
1. Preliminary Moves, 1556-1604
In a series of strategic moves after the fall of Astrakhan in 1556, Russia attempted to 
annex first the western, then the central, and finally the eastern Caucusus. A variety of 
strategies were used: outright military conquest, co-option, colonial settlement, and 
forced Christianization. Kabarda, which was coopted by the Russians was attacked in 
1587 by a joint Crimean and Ottoman force, which won a decisive military victory. In 
1604 Tsar Boris Godunov began a military offensive which ended in disaster. Russian 
fortresses on the Sulak, Terek, and Sunja rivers were lost, and Russia retreated north to 
Astrakhan. Russia would not make major military moves in the area for over 175 years. 
2. Peace and Social Change, 1604-1783
During this era Russia turned its attention to Europe, and the Ottoman empire maintained 
a protectorate after a military defeat at the hands of Iran. While there were no major 
military conflicts, three important changes would have significant repercussions for the 
future of the Caucusus. "First, religion became a major factor in the competition between 
the Ottoman Empire and Russia for the soul and alliance of the North Caucusus. 
Christianity retreated while Islam made steady progress in the western and central 
(regions of the) North Caucuses." Thus the foundation for future religious rivalries and 
wars was laid. Secondly, continued encroachment by Russian peasants (Cossacks) on the 
northern boundaries would play a significant role in future tensions and Russian 
strategies to gain military and political advantage. Thirdly, the decline of the Nogay 
horde north of the Caucasus meant that the military balance of power in the region 
became increasingly fragile. Russia would presently take advantage of this development. 
3. Military Advance and Consolidation, 1783-1824
With the destruction of the Crimean Khanate and the fall of Azaq in 1783, "The road was 
open for a face-to-face confrontation between Russia and the North Caucasus." Uniting 
the linguistically and socially diverse tribes, Sheikh Mansur Ushurma, a Chechen, 
managed to lead a coordinated military campaign against Russian incursions from 1785-
91. Sheikh Mansur was captured in the Ottoman fortress of Anapa in 1791 and died in 
exile in 1793. Russian advances continued under the leadership of General Ermolov. 
Using genocidal tactics for the first time in the Caucusus, Ermolov was able to subdue 
uncoordinated resistance by local princes and feudal lords. 
4. 'Ghazawat' Holy Wars, 1824-1922
"During this period the North Caucuses underwent a total (social and religious) change: 
the feudal system was replaced by clans and free peasant societies (uzden), and the tariqat 
(the Sufi Orders) provided a new ideology and became deeply implanted among the 
population. Unity was formed around the Shariat law as opposed to the customary law of 
the adat. Arabic language and culture spread from Daghestan to the Western Adyghe 
territories, and the last heathen Ingush auls were converted to Islam in the 1860's." 
Muridism, military jihad inspired by Sufi orders would provide the ideological and 
organizational principles for resistance to Russian military conquests in 1824-59 under 
the legendary Imam Shamil and again in 1877-78 and 1920-21. In the last uprising of this 
period the Caucuses was conquered but not pacified. As Broxup states, "In fact all the 
problems remained." 
5. The Soviet Period to Present Day, 1922-1995
The area witnessed several sporadic and ill fated rebellions. The Caucuses had its share 
of tragedy during the Stalinist purges. This period also witnessed the brutal genocide of 
mass deportation of North Caucasian nations in 1944-45. On December 12, 1994, 
Russian federal military units crossed the border with Chechnya threatening to consume 
the entire region in conflict. The first Russian Federal military casualties were soldiers 
ambushed in an Ingush village on the Chechen border. On December 31, 1994 Grozny 
was stormed. After almost a month of intense conflict the city fell. Organized armed 
resistance continues. 
MODERN CHECHEN DIASPORA
Beginning on February 23, 1944, on Stalin's orders, Chechen and Ingush people were 
exiled en masse to Central Asia. Transported in winter with few supplies, probably half 
of the people died in transit or in the closing months of the winter. Stalin accused the 
Chechens and Ingush of treason after an armed uprising by Chechens and Ingushetians in 
1943-1944. In fact, Germany never managed to enter Chechen territory nor is there any 
evidence that any material assistance was given. The uprising represented an attempt to 
assert indigenous Ingush-Chechen autonomy. The response was swift and vicious. 
Chechens and Ingush were returned to their ancestral lands beginning in 1957 shortly 
after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin. Small numbers of Chechen-Ingush people 
returned to quietly rebuild their lives. Ethnic Russians, having settled in expropriated 
lands, were resented. Simmering tensions over the Prigordny region, an area formerly 
part of Ingushetia and annexed by Ossetia flared between nominally Christian Ossetians 
and nominally Ingush people resulting in a massacre of between 3,000 and 10,000 Ingush 
shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the fall of 1992. 
Today some 100,000 Chechens live in Kazakhistan, and an unknown number of 
Chechens live and trade in Moscow. Ruslan Khasbulatov, an ethnic Chechen and former 
speaker of the Duma until October 1993, was born in Kazakhistan. Modern Chechens, 
educated with Soviet edited text books were largely ignorant of their history. The public 
knowledge and discussion of the mass exile began earnestly in 1991 with the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. Previously, only community elders had spoken about the events. 
With the break-up of the Soviet Union and some Caucasian intellectuals beginning to 
exercise their freedom, Chechens began to appreciate the extent of the historical 
injustices inflicted upon them. 
AN ATTEMPT AT INDEPENDENCE
The attempted putsch on August 19, 1991, signalled the end of the Soviet Communist era 
and the beginning of Yeltsin's rise and rule of the Russian Federation. Those events in 
Moscow triggered a series of events in Grozny that were to have a profound effect upon 
the Ingush-Chechen Autonomous Region. Shortly after news of the attempted coup 
reached Grozny, the National Chechen Congress chaired by Dzhokar Dudaev appealed 
for civil disobedience against the local government and also spoke out in defence of Z. 
Yandarbiev, leader of the Vainakh party, who had been arrested. 
A series of demonstrations followed (August 22, 27, 30) in support of the National 
Chechen Congress, which at that time represented democratic and nationalist sentiments. 
Support for Doku Zagaev, Chairman of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet and the 
whole Communist apparatus dwindled quickly. "On 6 September, 1991, after two weeks 
of round-the-clock demonstrations, the mainly pro-Communist Supreme Soviet was 
stormed while in session and disbanded by National Guard units of General Dudaev." 
Ruslan Khasbulatov, soon to be speaker of the Russian Supreme Soviet, welcomed the 
fall of Doku Zagaev, a long term adversary. September 7, 1991, is celebrated as the first 
day of independence from the USSR. 
Support by Russian Federation 'democratic' leaders was short-lived. Within six weeks a 
complete volte face had taken place, and Dudaev, the National Chechen Congress and his 
allies were being termed bandits and vilified by Russian Federation politicians 
(Khasbulatov and Rutskoi). On October 19 President Yeltsin signed a decree ordering the 
Chechen opposition forces to submit to the Russian Federation. The Chechen National 
Congress refused to bow to Russian Federation pressure to accept the legitimacy of the 
Provisional Council. Instead, elections were held on October 27, and Dzhokar Dudaev 
was elected president. Russian politicians have consistently argued the elections were 
unfair, while independent international monitors reported no irregularities. 
Further information is sketchy between Fall 1991 and August 1993. A few facts seem 
clear. Dzhokar Dudaev, as duly elected president, was able to consolidate political power. 
Secondly, as Russian military forces relinquished military bases in the fall of 1991, large 
amounts of heavy weapons, small arms, and ammunition were turned over to Chechen 
militias. Chechen Provisional Council opposition forces in the fall of 1994 and Russian 
military forces in January 1995 would pay dearly for this. Thirdly, the Russian Federation 
engaged in a program of aiding and abetting Chechen figures who would serve as pro-
Russian proxies and in turn tried to de-stabilize Chechnya through covert military aid. 
Some time in June 1994, Ruslan Labazanov and Dudaev had a falling out. No 
information surrounding these events are available. Labazanov took with him a cadre of 
armed men who would soon play a part in the political manoeuvering leading to the 
violent clashes in the Fall of 1994. 
On August 2, 1994, Umar Avturkhanov, leader of the Temporary Council, announced in 
Moscow that a coup had taken place ousting Dudaev from power. Eyewitnesses in 
Grozny said that the city was calm and no evidence of any actions was evident. Another 
Chechen rebel leader not aligned with Avturkhanov, Yaragi Mamodayev, called 
Avturkhanov's decree "unconstitutional." 
On August 8 1994, Ruslan Khasbulatov, former Speaker of the Supreme Soviet went to 
Chechnya, ostensibly to play the role of mediator. After the violent political crisis of 
October 1993, where Khasbulatov's opposition to Yeltsin was effectively ended, it 
seemed odd that Khasbulatov wanted to broker peace between Dudaev and Yeltsin. 
Sergei Shakhrai, Minister of Nationalities and an ally of Yeltsin was quoted as saying, "If 
Khasbulatov receives the support of the Chechen people I think the Federal centre will be 
obliged to work with him resolving the situation." 
Khasbulatov's peaceful intervention in Chechnya was probably an attempt by Yeltsin's 
camp to co-opt Khasbulatov and to give him a role in the political arena bringing him into 
the Yeltsin circle, thus denying a potential ally to opposition forces working against 
Yeltsin in Moscow. 
With tension mounting the Chechen Congress of Peoples Deputies representing various 
regions of Chechnya authorized Dudaev to mobilize Chechen armed forces on August 10, 
1994. Positions were hardening and armed conflict began to seem inevitable. The 
Provisional Council, equipped with funds from Moscow was trying to arm its own militia 
units and construct an alternative government structure. At no time does it appear that 
Avartkhunov, Khasbulatov, or Labanazov, all major players in the Provisional Council 
backed by Moscow, had anything more than localized support from their family clans. 
August 15, 1994, several mines exploded in Grozny, signalling an escalation of 
hostilities. By this time Khasbulatov had abandoned his role as mediator and was trying 
to establish his own militia and place himself in a position to gain political power after 
Dudaev's planned demise. In a rally on the outskirts of Grozny on August 25 in 
opposition to Dudaev, Labanazov was seen standing with Khasbulatov. The Chair of the 
Provisional Council Umar Avturkhanov did not attend. 
On August 26, 1994, between 150-300,000 attended a mass rally in support of Dudaev. 
Increasingly, Russia was seen by Chechens as trying to manipulate the political situation 
using covert military operations, just as had been done between Georgia and Abkhazia a 
year earlier. After heightened rhetoric but only sporadic military engagements, Dudaev's 
supporters clashed with Beslan Gantermirov in Ursus-Martan with ten casualties 
reported. Beslan Gantermirov, a former mayor of Grozny, was an independent opponent 
of Dudaev. After a series of clashes in September where neither Dudaev's supporters nor 
the Provisional Council are able to make decisive gains, a semblance of quiet descended 
upon Chechnya. In the midst of the lull, elders from various districts of Chechnya came 
to Moscow to receive assurances from representatives of the Ministry of Nationalities 
that Federation military forces would not become involved in what been till then had 
been, arguably, an internal Chechen conflict. The promises of 'non-intervention' they 
received were to be another bitter reminder of Russia's history of duplicity in the 
Caucasus. 
SYNOPSIS OF ASSAULT
The months of October and November saw a series of indecisive scrimmages with one 
side then the other gaining temporary advantage. Dudaev's political support and personal 
popularity seemed thin, but as it became clear that Provisional Council forces were 
nothing more than proxies of the Russian Federation, and in fact threatened Chechen 
autonomy, support for Dudaev stiffened. A frequent comment on the news from 
Chechnya during this time was, "we don't like Dudaev much, but if its between Dudaev 
and the Russians, we're with Dudaev." 
The critical juncture in what had been a farcical seesaw was the decision by the FSK to 
commit Russian mercenaries recruited from Interior Ministry units to fight for the 
Provisional Council and Russian Federation aircraft to attack the Grozny airport. The 
decision to escalate the conflict would have dire consequences. In a series of badly 
coordinated attacks on November 26-27, 1994, Provisional Council armored units 
manned by mercenaries, financed by the FSK, attacked Grozny and were repulsed with 
heavy casualties. Simultaneous attacks on the airport by Sukkoi fighters without 
markings left little doubt at to where these planes were from, who manned them, and who 
was behind these attacks: Russia. The defeat was a stinging blow to the FSK, spelled the 
end of Umar Avartkunov's political and military career, and presaged what was to come a 
month later. The FSK had upped the ante in trying to get rid of Dudaev. Risking Interior 
Ministry troops as mercenaries in the covert operation, they had not considered the 
consequences of the operation going awry. It went terribly wrong. Dudaev, in a 
precipitous political move, called their bluff. Dudaev threatened to execute the prisoners 
captured during the abortive attacks as mercenaries if the Russia Federation refused to 
acknowledge them as prisoners of war. The FSK was caught. If they denied their soldiers, 
they would be shot. If they admitted the soldiers were there on behalf of the FSK, the last 
pretext for impartially was gone. 
The Moscow News showed two pictures of Captain Andrei Rusakov. In the first picture 
he is shown giving an interview after the assault on the White House as a member of an 
elite Interior Ministry unit, and in the second he is shown as a prisoner in Grozny. The 
Interior Ministry first claimed the soldiers had been discharged, then that they were on 
leave, and then finally admitted that they were employed by the FSK. The evidence was 
incontrovertible. The last vestige of Russian neutrality was torn away by an independent 
and increasingly feisty press. 
On December 8, 1994, the last mercenary-POW captured during the abortive assaults ten 
days previous was returned to Ivan Chizh, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence. The 
efforts of Duma representatives, such as Yushenkov and Kovalyov were largely 
responsible. On the streets of Moscow, people anticipated serious negotiations to begin. 
On December 9, in a repudiation of Chechen good will, Boris Yeltsin authorized the use 
of "all available means" to settle the Chechnya question. The die was cast, and Yeltsin 
had sided with what was to be called in the coming days, the "party of power." On 
December 12th three armored columns invaded Chechnya from Daghestan, Ingushetia, 
and North Ossetia. 
One of the first casualties was the Ingushetian Minister of Health, who had tried to 
intervene between angry Ingush villagers and Russian soldiers. He was badly beaten by 
Russian soldiers and died the next day in hospital. Russian forces were ambushed in 
border villages between Ingushetia and Chechnya. Ramazan Abdulatipov, vice chairman 
of the Federation Council, explained resistance to Russian troops on Daghestani and 
Ingush soil this way. "To let an armed person across your territory to a neighbor means to 
be at one with him." 
Of the assault commanders, General Ivan Babichev leading an armored column from the 
west seemed least anxious to use armor against civilians, at one point refusing to move on 
Grozny and declaring to the thousand inhabitants of Novo-Shurvoi he would not go 
further. "It is not our fault that we are here. We did not want this, . . . This operation 
contradicted the constitution. It is forbidden to use the army against peaceful civilians. It 
is forbidden to shoot at the people." Babichev reflected widespread discontent within the 
army. Major General Voroboyov was offered the command of the ground forces in 
Chechnya by Pavel Grachev, Minister of Defence, and promptly threatened to resign. On 
December 31, 1994 Russian Federal armored columns under the cover of darkness 
attacked Grozny. What seemed like the last brutal strike against the Chechen people, 
turned with the coming of the New Year into a humiliating defeat. Russian armored 
columns were destroyed and raw recruits surrendered as combat commanders abandoned 
them. The whole assault became an embarrassing debacle. Russia's once mighty army 
was defeated by a lightly armed, highly motivated force of irregulars. It was shocking. 
For the first time the Russian public was treated to uncensored war reports on the nightly 
news. NTV, a new independent television station financed by the MOST group, had 
television crews on both sides of the conflict. Their reports would directly contradict time 
and again official announcements. Concerns over who was in charge in the Kremlin 
grew. 
In a series of four major assaults which were either frustrated or repulsed, Russian 
armored columns attempted to storm Grozny. The city was devastated by rocket and 
heavy artillery fire. Mothers of Soldiers, an organization which had been organized 
during the Afghanistan war came to life, and women came from all over the Russian 
Federation to claim their captured or dead sons in and around Grozny from Chechen 
commanders. Sergei Kovalyov, the professorial member of the Duma, and Yeltsin's 
appointee as head of Human Rights in the Russian Federation spent days with Chechen 
fighters in the bunker beneath the Chechen Presidential palace. General Gromov, a critic 
and opponent of Grachev, after much public opposition to the armed intervention was 
relieved of his duties in the Ministry of Defence. 
On January 19, 1995, after continuous bombardment for days, the Presidential palace in 
Grozny was relinquished by Chechen armed forces and Russian assault troops claimed 
their pyrrhic victory. Many thought that resistance would end. In fact the last road leading 
to Grozny was not firmly taken under control until the end of February, and even then 
snipers continued to operate in and around Grozny. While some villages around Grozny 
negotiated local truces and some clans opposed to Dudaev attempted to remain neutral, 
the majority of the population seemed embittered. They were preparing for a long, 
Afghanistan-style guerrilla war. 
REFUGEE AND RELIEF EFFORTS
The assault on Chechnya has created a humanitarian crisis. Medecins Sans Frontieres, 
UNHCR, and the International Red Cross/Red Crescent attempted to bring aid to the zone 
of conflict with varying success as the conflict developed. Bureaucratic delays frustrated 
prompt responses. The Russian Federation Emergency Situations Administration was 
offering Western relief and humanitarian agencies the opportunity to buy stocks of food 
and blankets from their Moscow warehouse and then airlift the supplies free of charge to 
Mozdok in the zone of conflict. That route proved to be less than satisfactory. 
On January 22 the MCC FSU Co-Country Representative and a student Intern from the 
University of Waterloo accompanied representatives from Memorial and a truck of 
material aid from Compassion Ministries to a refugee camp near Tver. The group of 
about a hundred from Grozny included refugees who had fled Baku two years ago, an 
ethnic German, and ethnic Russians. Another convoy of Material Aid from Compassion 
Ministries went to Tambov on February 10th accompanied by MCC representatives. At 
the time of writing [early April 1995] another convoy is scheduled to leave for Saratov 
the last week of March. 
On February 15, Lisa Amarkhadisaeva representing the Ingush Red Cross/Red Crescent, 
Jos Vanhee representing World Vision Russia/Belarus/Ukraine, Chris Hunter and Patricia 
Cockrell representing Quaker Peace and Service, Walter Bergen, Steve and Cheryl 
Hochstetler Shirk representing Mennonite Central Committee FSU met to discuss 
coordinated action to assist victims of the conflict. Through QPS contacts with the Ingush 
Red Crescent (InRC), and MCC's positive experience working with InRC in 1993, World 
Vision and MCC agreed to work with the InRC to provide relief supplies for refugees. 
World Vision and MCC provided immediate cash aid and then began a program of 
importing strategic Material Aid. World Vision committed itself to provide substantial 
funding for several development projects in Ingushetia. MCC is funding construction of a 
bakery, importing two 40 foot containers of assistance, one for Compassion Ministries 
and another for the InRC. Concurrently MCC imported three World Health Organization 
Health kits from Holland for the InRC. QPS Moscow provided crucial liaison and 
coordinating services. 
RELIGIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHECHEN CONFLICT: ISLAM AND 
CHRISTIANITY
At this time it is difficult to foresee the religious repercussions of the Chechen conflict. 
For the purposes of this paper we will focus on religious consequences and refer to 
economic, political, and social aspects as they affect the religious situation. Placed in a 
historical trajectory, the present Chechen conflict must be seen against the backdrop of 
Russia's posturing and military involvement in other Islamic contexts: Afghanistan some 
years ago, the present civil war in Tadjikistan, the Karabakh conflict, and Abkhazia's 
secession from Georgia. 
"Afghanistan has repeatedly been invoked in connection with the Chechen events. 
Afghanis who were quite peaceable and friendly prior to the introduction of a "limited 
contingent of Soviet Troops" have now turned into the indomitable warriors of Islam. 
And in contrast to Russia, they do not consider the war to be over." Islam proved to be 
the rallying point for disparate ethnic tribes (Uzbek and Tadjik) and clans in Afghanistan. 
If Islam will prove to be that rallying point in the North Caucuses to coalesce,resistance is 
an open question. Fighting under the banner of Islam, mujahedin became a formidable 
and feared military force which defeated Russia. The defeat in Afghanistan presaged a 
major turning point in the fortunes of the gerontocracy then in power. One wonders if the 
attack on Chechnya is a foretaste of another change, this time away from human rights 
and democracy towards greater authoritarianism. 
The present Chechen conflict, against traditionally Islamic people, "was kindled against 
the backdrop of President Yeltsin's speech in Budapest and Russia's stand on the Bosnian 
question. In this way Russia has ever more distinctly been acquiring an image as the 
enemy of Muslims. This was confirmed by MCC representatives in the Middle East who 
monitored the unfolding conflict. The perception that Russia is an enemy of Muslims has 
dangerous consequences. Sheikh Ravil Gainatutdin, Chairman of the Board of Muslims 
in the Central European part of Russia in an interview in Moscow News said, "The image 
of an enemy Muslim is being shaped up in the minds of the Russians. This is very 
dangerous if we consider that 18 million Muslims live in Russia." 
The leadership of the Russian military apparatus, in an attempt to explain away military 
set-backs,has claimed that up to 6,000 Muslim mercenaries are fighting for Chechnya. 
The tactics of Russian officers trying to motivate young recruits to fight in Chechnya are 
instructive. "We had terrible fears about their religion," said Sergei Bozhko, a conscript 
who deserted in Chechnya. "The officers tried to bring it home to us . . . that Chechens 
were like Arab terrorists portrayed in Hollywood movies, only worse--uneducated 
Moslem fanatics blinded by Islam . . . who would gouge our eyes out and rip our bowels 
open." Reports of forced conversions have also surfaced. 
The perceptions and statements of Islamic leaders in Russia sheds light on their 
frustrations and also the potential for dialogue. Sheikh Gabdulla Hadji Galiulla, head 
mufti of the Russian Federation speaking at a meeting of 17 leading clerics in Moscow 
Thursday, February 17, 1995, said that if the Chechen conflict was not already "a 
religious war pitting Moslems against Christians, the threat of this was imminent." 
Sheikh Galiulla went on to say that if the Russian leadership did not resolve the conflict 
soon, Islamic leadership in the Russian Federation would actively try to influence 
presidential elections. 
Sheikh Nafigulla Hadji Ashirov, chairman of the executive committee of the Spiritual 
Leadership of Moslems in Russia, frustrated by the lack of even a simple 
acknowledgement of their request to meet with Boris Yeltsin said, "When Moslems--as 
well as Christians--are played like Marionettes, the government is not showing serious 
respect for these confessions. It would be entirely unwise not to reckon with the potential 
[of Islam]." 
Comments by Sheikh Muhammad-Husein Hadji Alsabekov, the mufti representing Islam 
in the break away republic were less magnanimous. Alsabekov asserted that for every 
church destroyed, a hundred mosques were destroyed, and that Russia was pursuing the 
"extermination of the Moslems." Sheikh Ashirov's closing comments were ominous. 
"This is not yet a Moslem-Christian conflict, but if it should evolve into a war between 
Islam and Christianity, this will not be a war within the bounds of Russia, and that would 
be something terrible." 
The prospects of Central Russian autonomous areas such as Tatarstan or Chuvash 
wanting greater independence from Moscow and by implication more solidarity with 
Turkic-Islamic people in the North Caucusus may cause the Russian Federation to resort 
to armed measures. Similarly, the prospects of the North Caucuses peoples, frustrated in 
their quest for autonomy, turning to Islam as a rallying point for an armed struggle of 
independence means that religion will play an increasingly prominent and radicalizing 
role in the North Caucasus. If historical strategies are any indication, a nationalist form of 
Orthodoxy will become an important instrument of opposition against Muslim 
communities in Central Russia and the Caucuses. 
Another important player will be ethnic Russian minorities living within the territories of 
the North Caucasian republics around Chechnya. On the whole they see their future not 
with Islamic Caucasian republics, but with 'Mother Russia.' While some express concern 
over the brutality of the Chechen invasion, many are in basic agreement with the Russian 
Federation's actions. Support for "upholding the constitution" is strong in North Ossetia. 
Ethnic Russians within the North Caucuses perceive themselves as a persecuted minority 
in a majority, Muslim (however nominal) context. The prospects for dialogue and 
mediation are not very inspiring, at the moment, though efforts in the region continue. 
In all likelihood, Russia will proceed on a multi-lateral strategy of co-option. On the 
religious front, if Russian military and political leaders can shake the present lethargy and 
incompetence, a strategy of encouraging and playing off Orthodox and Islamic groups 
one against the other will probably take shape. Religion continues to be viewed as an 
instrument to be manipulated by those who are presently in power in Moscow. Within 
Islam, the most vulnerable to manipulation are those groups with historic ties to the 
Council of Religious Affairs. The least vulnerable are the Sufi Brotherhoods in the North 
Caucuses who have resisted co-option since their inception. 
If Christian sponsored relief agencies are to have a helpful role to play in this zone of 
conflict, the experience of the Mennonite Central Committee in the Horn of Africa and 
the Middle East may prove crucial. Seeking common ground, building relationships of 
integrity, seeking justice, sharing a critique of imperial Christianity may be areas of 
common interest, understanding and dialogue between Mennonites and Caucasian 
Moslems. At a meeting on February 15, a MCC FSU representative spoke about the 
anguish of observing the conflict and hoped that somehow the small efforts made by 
Christian sponsored relief organizations might dispel some of the suffering and provide 
the opportunity for dialogue and friendship. Lisa Amarkhadisaeva of the Ingush Red 
Cross/Red Crescent responded to the effect that, "many believe that the many misfortunes 
we've experienced have come because we are Ingush, that we are Moslem. But the 
assistance that comes from Christian organizations, or from Christian countries tells us 
this is not so. In Ingushetia, people know who the Mennonites are. They know where the 
help has come from." 
POSTSCRIPT
The consequences of the invasion in Chechnya continue to reverberate across the Former 
Soviet Union and beyond. The refugee crisis continues as Russian government officials 
pick through the ruins of Grozny and realize that Grozny is beyond repair. On March 6, 
the European Union postponed indefinitely a proposed trade accord as a direct 
consequence of Russia's actions in Chechnya. In a much less courageous move, on March 
10, the IMF signed an agreement with the Yeltsin government for a 6.3 billion dollar 
loan, in an attempt to assist the government in maintaining a tight fiscal policy. No one 
acknowledged the obvious: the loan would pay for the cost of the Chechen conflict. 
Chechnya's neighbors have viewed the events of the past year with alarm and the 
prospects for violence increases. "Although officially Daghestan, Karbadino-Balkharia 
and Ingushetia are neutral, their internal national movements have been growing more 
and more radical. Not only do they call for an end to the war, they are increasingly more 
active in urging territorial redivision in the North Caucuses, demanding the secession of 
their republics from Russia. As the conflict drags on, the threat of terrorism in Russia 
which appeared to be mythical is becoming real. The Chechen Diaspora in Moscow and 
St. Petersburg has not resorted to terrorism because investments in the Russian economy 
was considered more important than Dudayev's ambition. 
But the guerrillas have become more fragmented. Dudaev, and more importantly the 
Chechen Council of Elders and the Diaspora representatives are now having a difficult 
time controlling them." The humanitarian crisis, the prospects of terrorism, a partisan 
war, and restive Caucasian republics all point toward complex and difficult political 
times ahead. Perhaps the most ominous repercussion of the war is the politicization of the 
military. Possibly the best known political organization active in the military has been the 
Union of Officers. It has been on the fringes of the political mainstream since the October 
crisis when former Deputy Defense Minister Vladislav Achalov and Lieutenant Colonel 
Stanislav Terekhov were part of the short-lived cabinet of Alexander Rutskoi. This 
former fringe group held a conference where dissatisfied military leaders sent delegates 
or observers. Yeltsin's support in the military is weak. The prospects of the military 
taking an activist role in the chaotic political arena that is Russia and asserting its own 
interests means that the balance of power may shift dramatically. 
On March 14, 1995, a peace plan to end the Chechen conflict was being forged by 
Human Rights Commissioner Sergei Kovalyov, Deputy Speaker of the Federal Council 
Ramazan Adulatipov, and others. I have high regard for both of these men but have little 
confidence that they will be able to meaningfully mediate in the conflict so long as the 
power ministries (FSK, Interior Ministry, Army) are not involved or have a direct stake in 
the implementation of the plan. 
In a recent speech, Senator Bob Dole outlined the Republican version of 'Strategic 
Interests' in the Middle East and in that speech enlarged the sphere of America's Middle 
Eastern strategic interests to include the Caspian Basin. The prospects for North 
Caucasian nationalities having their rightful aspirations, including religious freedom, 
frustrated for the 'strategic interests' of neighbors seems unpleasantly, assured. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Broxup, Marie Benningsen, ed., The North Caucasus Barrier. New York: St. Martins 
Press, 1992. 
Esposito, John L., Islam: The Straight Path. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Moscow News. 
Moscow Times. 
Moscow Tribune. 
Shenk, Wilbert R., editor, Mission Focus: Annual Review. 3003 Benham Ave., 
Elkhart,IN, 46517, 1994. 
 
